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Abstract 
This paper has established an evolutionary game model, and has examined the promotional effect of the rising oil price 
on companies’ behaviour of carbon emission reduction. The research results show that, the promotional impact of the rising 
oil price on companies’ carbon reduction behaviour is uncertain. In the case of the rising oil price, the evolutionary result of 
companies’ carbon emission reduction behaviour will depend on the extent of the rising oil price, the initial status of 
companies, the saved cost and the revenues from emission permits. At the same time, the percentage of companies who 
reduce carbon emission at the initial evolutionary period will also influence the evolution direction of the whole group. This 
paper has showed the relationship between the rising oil price and companies’ carbon reduction behaviour, and it will 
provide theoretical reference for promulgating rational low carbon policies. 
© 2014 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V.  
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1. Introduction 
Since the 19th century, the oil price fluctuated dramatically and many scholars have carried out extensive 
research about it. Didier et al.1 attributed the rising oil price to the amplifying result of speculations. There are 
also different voices. Fabian2 considered the speculative effect was limited and temporary. And behind the high 
oil price, Frederic and Judith3 have indicated that the normal oil production will reach its peak in the near future. 
Casler and Rose4 have studied, by structural analysis of input-output, the varying factors of carbon dioxide 
emission in the U.S.A for the period of 1972-1982. Bas and Detlef5 have focused on the hikes in hydrocarbon 
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prices during the past several years, which cause the investment choice in energy system and the concern of 
uncertainty in the cost reduction of greenhouse gases by using a global energy model TIMER.  
It should be noted that, few scholars, while choosing sample period, have attached enough importance to the 
volatility of oil price in various studies on carbon emission from the energy perspective. Meanwhile, oil is an 
important carbon emission source with the background of the hikes in price. So it will be of necessity and 
significance to study companies’ behavior of carbon emission reduction. Taking into account the significant 
characteristic that the oil price and carbon price have all significant positive correlations6, this paper will 
observe the evolutionary effect of oil price rise on companies’ behaviors of carbon emission reduction. 
2. Evolutionary game model of companies’ behavior of carbon emission reduction and its analysis 
 In obligatory trading system, to emit pollution will require sufficient emission permits. For example, the 
European Union has applied a unified carbon emission trading market. With the ever increasing attention to 
carbon emission, in this paper, companies are forced to join in the carbon emission trading market by the 
government. 
 In order to avoid the rise of operation cost caused by high oil price, a company can choose to invest in 
cleaner energy so as to reduce energy consumption, or to use cleaner energy. Surender and Shunsuke’s7 
research has shown that the long-term rise of oil price will lead to technological advancements at a global level. 
On the other hand, companies can also utilize cheaper energies but with higher carbon emission. Bas and Detlef 
5 indicate that the rise of oil price has increased coal consumption. When the oil price has entered the rising 
period, the percentage of China’s coal and oil consumption in the total energy consumption has also reached its 
turning point. Then coal’s percentage has rose, while oil’s has decreased, just as shown by Fig.1 and Fig.2. For 
the convenience of discussion, we will entitle Category I to behaviours of increasing investment in cleaner 
energy or using cleaner energy, and Category II to behaviours of using cheaper energy with higher carbon 
emission. As shown in Fig.3, behaviours of Category І will lead to the lowering of energy intensity or reduce 
carbon emission; while behaviours of Category II will cause the increase of carbon emission. At present, 
scholars pay more attention to the reduction of carbon emission or energy intensity in the case of the rise of oil 
or other energy prices, while few attention has been attached to the situation that the prices rise together with 
the increase of carbon emission. 
Fig. 1. The percentage of coal in energy consumption 
The evolutionary game theory is a theory that combines the game analysis with the dynamic evolutionary 
process. It aims to study a group that evolves with the time, so as to understand the dynamic process of group 
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evolution. It can explain how and why the group will reach its status in future. The evolutionary game theory 
thus provides a good guidance in studying companies’ behavior evolution in the process of the rising oil price. 
In the evolutionary game model, the evolution speed of a strategy can be formulated into a dynamic differential 
equation: 
 kdx xdt  S  S > @0,1x                                                                                                                           (1) 
In this equation, x  indicates the percentage using k strategy; kS  is the expected revenues of the 
corporations who choose this strategy, and S  is the expected revenues of the whole group. If 0dxdt ! , the 
group will evolve towards the strategy k ; on the contrary, if 0dx
dt
 , it will evolve in the opposite direction. 
Fig. 2. The Percentage of oil in energy consumption 
Fig. 3. Two categories of behaviors 
2.1. The evolutionary game for behavior of category I 
In the case that companies do not reduce their emission, their revenues are n ( 0n ! ). And the companies 
that invest in reducing their emission afford a cost c ( 0c ! ). However, while these companies can obtain 
revenues by selling their surplus emission permits, while those that do not reduce their emission will have to 
pay more to purchase emission permits, thus, the values of these extra permits are m . It is known that 
0
oil
dm
dp
! , so we can know the impact of the rising oil price on the evolution by studying m . Here the 
hypothesis is that the other variables are independent on the oil price, and at the end of the paper, we will 
explain that, even without this hypothesis, our model still stands, and we will explain the situation in the 
the rising oil price the increasing cost
Category I behavior reduce carbon emission
Category II behavior increase carbon emission
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numerical example that other variables are connected with the oil price. When all the companies reduce their 
emission, they will not obtain revenues from the carbon emission trading market. And in the case that 
companies do not reduce their emission and they cannot purchase emission permits, they will pay the sanction 
s  to the government. Supposing that the rising oil price has added cost a  to a company. If the company 
chooses not to reduce its emission, it will have to bear all the cost; and in the case that the company chooses to 
invest to reduce its emission, it can avoid partially the added cost b ( 0 b a  ) caused by the rising oil price. 
Supposing that the percentage of the companies who reduce their emission through increasing investment or 
using cleaner energy represents x ( 0 1xd d ) in the total, then the percentage of the companies that do not 
reduce their emission will be (1 x ). All the participants of the game have bounded rationality, and they will 
make strategic choices through incessant studying and imitation. Their strategic space is (Y, N), in which 
Y=investment, N= non-investment. Then the payoff matrix of emission reduction behavior is shown as the 
following table 1.  
Table 1. The payoff matrix of companies’ investment behavior 
 
According to the payoff matrix, the payoff of investment and no-investment behaviors will be respectively: 
 1Y n c a b x mS        and  1N n a xm x sS      . The expected revenues of the overall 
industry will then be:  1Y Nx xS  S   S .  
From equation (1), the evolution speed chose to invest in cleaner energy is:  
    1Ydx x x x m b s c xsdt  S S                                                                                            (2) 
Let 0dx
dt
 , we obtain three critical values: 0,1, ax x , in which 1a m b cx s
   . 
In order not to lose the generality of our discussion, we will discuss the position of ax  in the following three 
cases:  
(1) When 0m b c  ! , 1ax ! . Point 1x   is the stable point in the evolution. Companies will evolve 
towards the direction of reducing emission, and the evolutionary path is shown in Fig 4 ( a ). That is to say, in 
the case that the sum of the emission revenues and the cost of energy consumption saved by investment exceed 
the cost of investment, companies will evolve towards the direction of investment in the reduction of carbon 
emission.  
(2) When m b c s    , 0ax  . Point 0x   is the point of stabilization in the evolution, all companies 
will evolve towards the direction of no investment, and the evolutionary path is shown in Fig 4 (b). In other 
words, in the case that the sum of carbon-emission revenues and the cost that can be saved is less than the 
Companies
Companies
Behaviors
Y( )x
N( )1 x
Y( )x N( )1 x
n c a b  
n c a b  
n c a b m   
n a m 
n a m 
n c a b m   
n a s 
n a s 
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balance of the cost of investment and carbon taxes, all companies will evolve towards the direction of non-
investment, resulting in the increase of carbon emission.  
(3) When 0s m b c     , if  0, ax x , 0dxdt !  and it will evolve towards 1x  ; if  ,1ax x , 
0dx
dt
  and it will evolve towards 0x  . The evolutionary routes are shown in Fig 4 (c). In this situation, 
ax x  is the stable point for the evolution, and wherever the initial status of x  is, whichever direction it 
evolves, it can never reach the position of 1 or 0. In the case that the sum of permit revenues and the saved cost 
can be either less than the investment cost, or exceeds the balance of investment cost and carbon taxes, it is 
possible that companies may evolve towards the direction of reducing emission, or towards the direction of no 
emission reduction as well, which will depend on the initial position of companies in the evolution. That is to 
say, the initial condition of the evolution will determine the evolutionary direction of companies’ emission-
reduction behavior, which will increase or decrease in the carbon emission. When the initial position of 
evolution is at  ,1ax , the quantity of carbon emission will increase; while in the case that the initial position 
is at  0, ax , the carbon emission will decrease. 
Fig. 4. The evolutionary routes of companies’ investment behaviors 
Conclusion I: The rise of oil price will increase the operation cost of the companies, but this is not the reason 
of companies’ investment. Their option to invest depends on the relationship among four variables: the 
revenues from emission permits, the cost saved from their investment, the cost of investment, and the extent of 
government sanction. 
Conclusion II: The condition for all companies to evolve towards the direction of emission reduction is that 
the sum of emission revenues and the cost saved from investment should surpass the cost of the company’s 
investment.  
From Fig 4 (b) and (c), it can be observed that, even in the case of the rising oil price, if under 
m b c s     or 0    s m b c , and the initial position is at  ,1ax , the quantity of carbon 
emission will still increase. 
Conclusion III: In the case of the rising oil price, companies will still evolve towards the direction of no 
emission reduction, leading to the increasing of carbon emission.  
2.2.  The evolutionary game for behavior of category II 
In Fig 3, companies will also choose behaviors of Category II possibly. No matter if it is behavior of 
category I or category II, they can avoid, partially, the cost caused by the rise of oil price. For the convenience 
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of discussion, we suppose that the avoided costs by these two behaviors are the same as b . The payoff matrix 
is shown as table 2, in which Y stands for changing the energy, and N signifies not.  
Table 2. The payoff matrix of changing energy behavior 
 
According to the payoff matrix, the payoffs of changing the energy or not will be respectively:  
 1Y n a b xt x mS        and N n a xmS    , then the expected revenues of the whole industry 
will be:  1Y Nx xS  S   S .  
By the duplicated differential equation, the evolution speed that applies emission reduction strategy is :  
        1Ydx x x x b m xsdt  S S                                                                                                  (3) 
Let 0dx
dt
 , we obtain three critical values: 0,1, bx x , in which, b b mx s
 . 
(1) When m b! , 0x   is the stable point in the evolution and all companies evolve towards the direction 
of not changing the energy. That is to say, in the case that the emission right revenues exceed the cost saved 
from changing energy, companies will all evolve towards the direction not to change the energy, which 
signifies the reduction of carbon emission.  
(2) When m b s  , 1x  is the stable point in the evolution. In the case that the emission permit 
revenues are less than the balance of the saved cost and carbon taxes, companies will all evolve towards the 
direction of replacing the energy resulting in the rise of carbon emission. 
(3) When b s m b   , if  0, bx x , it will evolve towards 1x  ; and if  ,1bx x , it will evolve 
towards 0x  . Now, Point bx x  is the stable point in the evolution. In other words, the final results of 
evolution is that bx  companies have changed the energy that they used, and (1 bx ) companies do not use the 
energy. At this moment, the carbon emission may increase or decrease correspondently.  
Conclusion IV: when the oil price rises, in the case that companies’ emission permit revenues are less than 
the balance of the saved cost and carbon taxes, all companies will evolve towards the direction to change the 
energy, which means the increase of carbon emission. And even if the emission permit revenues exceed the 
balance of the two, on the condition that the emission permit revenues are less than the saved cost, some 
companies may evolve towards the direction to change their energy possibly, which also means the increase of 
carbon emission.  
From the analysis of the above two situations, we can obtain the relationship between the carbon emission 
quantity and carbon emission permits or oil price. Fig.5 shows the changes that carbon emission quantity varies 
Companies
Companies
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Y( )x
N( )1 x
Y( )x N( )1 x
n a b s  
n a b s  
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n a b m  
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with the carbon emission permits or oil price. In Section I, companies begin to abandon oil and use cheaper 
energies but with higher carbon emission. Namely, in this section carbon emission increases with the increase 
of oil price or with the increase of carbon emission rights. Just as Bas5 describes, when the price of 
hydrocarbons rises, the amount of coal usage will increase. In Section II, with the rising oil price, the carbon 
emission decreases, because companies that use cheaper energy but with higher carbon emission abandon this 
energy and begin to use oil. Casler4 demonstrated this situation. In Section III, the carbon emission does not 
vary with the oil price, and at this moment, companies do not choose the cheaper energy with higher carbon 
emission, and not to invest either. In Section IV, the carbon emission decreases with the rise of oil price, 
because at this moment, companies begin to choose to invest so as to improve their energy’s utilization 
efficiency. In Section V, the carbon emission not only decreases, but decreases faster than that of Section IV, 
since more companies choose to invest.  
Fig. 5. The relationship between permit revenues (oil price) and carbon emission 
3. The practical usage of research results 
This paper has analysed the evolutionary paths of companies’ emission reduction behaviour by applying the 
evolutionary game theory and by establishing an evolutionary game model of companies’ carbon emission 
reduction behaviour in the case of the rising oil price. In China’s present energy consumption structure, coal is 
the main energy. If Chinese government intends to realize it objective of carbon emission reduction, the most 
important thing to do is to apply necessary policies that will promote companies to engage in technological 
innovation or to use clean energies and to avoid the situation that more companies would use coal as dominant 
energy which cause the increase of carbon emission.  
Because of the differences in initial conditions of each industry, companies’ evolution directions are 
uncertain, that is to say, it may evolve towards the direction of emission reduction, may also change to the 
direction of no emission reduction. Hence, when the government establishes regulations and laws, it should 
take full consideration of different initial conditions of each industry. Otherwise, the government’s regulations 
or laws will lead companies to abandon their current energies while using energies much cheaper but with 
higher carbon emission, which will result in an unfavorable situation that the carbon emission will increase. 
And compared with the developing countries, the emission reduction and energy-saving technology is more 
advanced in the developed countries8, thus the government of developing countries should be more prudent 
when making policies.  
We will continue the basic thoughts of this paper further in three aspects: the impact of investment 
irreversibility on companies’ evolution; the influence of oil price rise on China’s coal consumption; and the 
empiric study of variables from the estimation model. 
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